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Europe Won’t Be Independent of American Technology

Why Europe Won’t Be Independent of American Technology Anytime Soon

Europe has decided it wants technological independence from the United States. On paper, the ambition makes sense. American companies dominate the operating systems on European computers, much of the cloud infrastructure storing European data, major payment networks, and the processors driving the artificial intelligence boom. Relying too heavily on any foreign supplier is a strategic risk. The trouble begins when a reasonable concern becomes a familiar European production line: publish a strategy, announce an impressive number, assemble a committee, and congratulate everyone before the difficult work starts. Apparently, a sufficiently confident PowerPoint can now qualify as industrial infrastructure.

That does not mean Europe is technologically helpless. It has Airbus, ASML, SAP, excellent universities, advanced manufacturers, telecommunications expertise, and open-source developers building software used around the world. Nor should every European initiative be attributed to Brussels. Some projects belong to national governments, others to private businesses, and many to international communities. The European Commission cannot take credit for every success born on the continent, just as it cannot be blamed when every privately funded startup discovers that customers are harder to acquire than government grants.

The real issue is not whether Europe should cut itself off from America. That would replace sensible risk management with technological isolation. It is whether European institutions and businesses can continue operating when a foreign supplier changes its prices, contracts, export rules, or political priorities. Who controls the software? Who can interrupt a payment? Who owns the infrastructure? Can customers move their data and keep working? Those are better measures of independence than the number of times a politician says the word sovereignty.

Visa, Mastercard, and the Judge Who Couldn’t Pay

One of the sharpest demonstrations of Europe’s dependence came not from a technology conference but from American sanctions against international legal officials. On June 5, 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned Beti Hohler, a Slovenian judge serving at the International Criminal Court (ICC). On July 9, it sanctioned Francesca Albanese, an Italian United Nations special rapporteur. On August 20, French ICC judge Nicolas Guillou was added. These were not European Union representatives negotiating on behalf of Brussels. They were officials of international institutions caught in the Trump administration’s disputes over ICC investigations and actions concerning American and Israeli nationals.

Washington maintains that the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction over nationals of countries that have not accepted the court’s authority. The ICC takes a different legal position in cases involving alleged crimes on territory within its jurisdiction. People can disagree about that dispute without missing what happened next. Hohler reported that her credit cards were canceled. Guillou described being cut off from American-linked services and ordinary payment arrangements. Albanese also faced financial restrictions. None needed to enter the United States for American sanctions to reach into their daily lives.

On April 8, 2026, Guillou testified before a French parliamentary inquiry that his French Visa card had been canceled. His bank, he said, could not give him a usable card operating exclusively on France’s domestic Cartes Bancaires network, because the cards available to him were co-branded with Visa or Mastercard. France has its own card scheme, but that fact was not much comfort when the particular card and its commercial relationships remained exposed. He also described European service providers restricting relationships to avoid sanctions risk, sometimes beyond what the letter of US law necessarily required. A French judge, in France, with a French bank, finding that American policy can interfere with buying ordinary things. Not quite the independence advertised in the brochure.

There is a legal distinction worth preserving: US sanctions do not automatically prohibit every European transaction, and the consequences depend on the parties, payment channels, and applicable rules. But the episode exposed the power hidden in corporate networks and compliance departments. A payment system is not sovereign just because the bank’s office has a European address. Dependence stops being an academic term when the card reader says no.

Europe’s Payment Alternative: A Network, Not a New Mastercard

Europe is not starting without options. Wero, developed by the privately led European Payments Initiative, began rolling out in 2024 and enables account-to-account payments that do not require conventional international card rails. Spain’s Bizum, Italy’s Bancomat, Portugal’s MB WAY, and other national services are already important in their domestic markets. Europe has working payment systems. What it lacks is a sufficiently universal, internationally competitive arrangement that people can rely on across countries, merchants, and use cases.

On September 30, 2026, Bancomat, Bizum, Wero, MB WAY, and Vipps MobilePay announced the European Network for Payments (ENP), a Madrid-based joint venture designed to connect existing solutions. Its founding participants already serve roughly 130 million users across 13 European countries. The plan is to make cross-border person-to-person payments work first, followed by online and in-store transactions. Importantly, this is an interoperability venture created by payment companies, not the EU unveiling a brand-new Mastercard from a government department.

Connecting established national systems is probably smarter than building a new card network from nothing. But it still means reconciling banking standards, fraud prevention, refunds, merchant software, consumer expectations, and years of accumulated infrastructure. Visa and Mastercard did not become globally useful by announcing that their headquarters had excellent values. Their networks work because millions of merchants and institutions have already integrated them. ENP may make real progress. It just cannot make that entire history disappear by issuing a press release. An agreement among payment providers is not yet the same thing as an agreement between your supermarket terminal and your bank.

Two New Office Suites, Several Old Foundations

On March 4, 2026, Dutch company Office.eu launched a cloud-based productivity platform in The Hague. CEO Maarten Roelfs presented it as a European-controlled alternative to Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace, emphasizing European ownership, hosting, and data control. It is a private commercial service, not a European Union office suite written from scratch with public money. It also draws on established technology, including Nextcloud and the broader open-source office ecosystem. That is perfectly legitimate. Reusing good software is often a better engineering decision than rebuilding a spreadsheet engine merely to give it a different flag.

Then, on March 27, another initiative appeared: Euro-Office. Backed by companies and organizations including Nextcloud and IONOS, it builds on a fork of ONLYOFFICE’s editing technology. The names are confusing, but the distinction matters. Office.eu is a hosted workspace; Euro-Office is an editor project intended for integration into other products. Office.eu has also appeared among Euro-Office’s supporters. Europe managed to produce two strikingly similar brand names in the same month, although their products are different. Microsoft’s lawyers must have enjoyed that naming workshop.

The Euro-Office launch rapidly produced a more serious argument. On March 30, ONLYOFFICE accused the project of breaching licensing requirements by removing required branding and attribution. ONLYOFFICE has historical business connections to Russia, though it says its intellectual property is held by a Latvian entity and that Russian operations were separated. The Free Software Foundation later disputed whether the additional logo requirements were compatible with the GNU Affero General Public License version 3 (AGPLv3). Nextcloud rejected the accusation of infringement and described its approach to compliance. These remain competing interpretations, not proof that Euro-Office stole software or that Office.eu is secretly controlled from Russia. An open-source licensing dispute is a legal question, not a substitute for evidence.

And there is a far more mundane obstacle. Replacing a Microsoft subscription does not instantly replace Exchange, Teams, identity systems, specialized business software, elaborate Excel macros, Access databases, and countless document workflows. A spreadsheet that opens but calculates differently is not a successful migration. Neither is a beautifully sovereign email interface that fails to connect to the organization’s existing directory. The real competitor to Microsoft is not a logo. It is the entire ecosystem that keeps an office functioning on Monday morning.

LibreOffice: German Foundation, International Code

Europe already has a mature open-source office suite. LibreOffice released version 26.2 on February 4, 2026, and is coordinated by The Document Foundation, a nonprofit based in Berlin. Its history runs from German-developed StarOffice through Sun Microsystems and Oracle, while today’s project receives contributions from developers and organizations around the world. That heritage does not make LibreOffice American property, Russian property, or European Union property. It makes it an international software project with a complicated but traceable history.

LibreOffice’s main licensing framework includes the Mozilla Public License 2.0 and LGPL-related licensing arrangements, while particular inherited components have other open-source licenses. Contributors retain rights under the applicable terms; The Document Foundation does not magically own every line of code because it is based in Germany. The fact that some widely used open-source licenses were created in the United States is equally irrelevant to who can operate the program. A license is a set of legal permissions and obligations, not a remote shutdown button in Washington.

Those licenses allow people and businesses to use, inspect, modify, and redistribute the software subject to their conditions. They do not automatically transfer ownership of the original project or grant unrestricted use of its trademarks. This matters when a vendor markets a service as entirely European. European hosting, European company ownership, open-source licensing, and independent control of every software component are four different propositions. They can overlap without being identical. The useful question is whether users can keep running, maintaining, and replacing their software if a supplier disappears. That sounds less exciting than digital sovereignty, but it is substantially more useful.

Leaving Windows, Installing Linux

Linux is a serious operating system, and running thousands of managed Linux desktops is not some experimental activity conducted by enthusiasts in basements. An organization can choose a supported distribution, standardize it, and maintain a stable fleet. The hard part begins after Windows disappears. Governments have accumulated decades of Microsoft Office macros, Access databases, procurement systems, authentication tools, scanner drivers, electronic-signature software, custom integrations, and specialist applications. Installing a different operating system is straightforward compared with making every surrounding business process work on it.

Munich is the cautionary story. In 2003, the city voted to move toward open-source desktops, ultimately migrating more than 15,000 computers to its customized LiMux environment by 2013. In 2017, political leaders chose a return toward Windows. Compatibility problems, organizational difficulties, and changing priorities contributed, while LiMux defenders argued that the software had become a convenient scapegoat for management failures. Munich later renewed its commitment to open source. In the space of a few elections, the city’s IT strategy managed to travel in both directions. At least the computers were familiar with the route.

Schleswig-Holstein has followed a more consistent path. On December 4, 2025, digitalization minister Dirk Schrödter reported that almost 80% of relevant state-administration workstations outside the tax administration were using LibreOffice. He said the transition had avoided more than €15 million in license costs, while approximately €9 million in one-time migration and development spending was planned for 2026. Roughly one-fifth of covered workstations still needed some Microsoft Office components because specialist applications were not ready. The savings were meaningful, but the costs did not evaporate. They moved into migration, support, and development, where someone still has to pay the people doing the work.

On September 19, 2026, Schrödter announced another milestone: more than 200 people in the State Chancellery were now using Linux, while approximately 20 workstations remained on Windows because of technical dependencies. This is what credible progress reporting looks like. It names both the achievement and the exceptions. It also illustrates why the last few incompatible applications can be more troublesome than the first few thousand computers. A government can move 95% of its desktops and still have a critical system that refuses to leave the remaining 5%.

France offers an even stronger success story. Its National Gendarmerie spent years replacing proprietary applications before expanding the use of GendBuntu, its customized Ubuntu-based system. During testimony to French lawmakers on May 7, 2026, General Marc Boget reported that the organization had no Windows servers remaining and that only 1,054 of approximately 80,000 workstations still used Windows for specialist needs. That is a remarkable achievement built over many years, not a campaign slogan made real overnight. The institution developed internal expertise and adapted its procedures instead of expecting its suppliers to solve every dependency for it.

Austria’s armed forces also moved roughly 16,000 workstations toward LibreOffice, completing its major office-software transition in 2025 while retaining necessary exceptions. Crucially, this was not the wholesale replacement of Windows. Denmark’s 2025 pilots and phased office-software changes were likewise sometimes reported as if an entire country were abandoning Microsoft’s operating system. Replacing Word is not the same as replacing Windows. Journalists occasionally find that distinction less convenient than a dramatic headline.

After the launch events come patch management, security, user training, backups, document conversion, identity management, procurement contracts, and support for niche applications. Open source can reduce vendor lock-in, but it does not abolish maintenance costs. A government can swap dependence on Microsoft for dependence on a single contractor, a mountain of unmaintained custom code, or an understaffed internal IT team. The goal should be systems that work, that can be repaired, and that do not demand ransom-like licensing terms to remain useful. The penguin logo is optional.

Europe’s Cloud Problem: European Data Centers, American Control

There is another rather large dependency behind nearly everything in this article: cloud infrastructure. Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud dominate the European market. Synergy Research Group reported in July 2025 that European cloud providers held only about 15% of their regional market, even though their revenue had more than tripled since 2017. The market grew much faster than the local providers did. Europe was buying more cloud services, and much of the extra business was going to the same American giants it now hopes to become less dependent on. That is a peculiar way to prepare for independence, although an efficient way to finance somebody else’s expansion.

A server standing in Frankfurt, Paris, or Dublin is not automatically under exclusively European control. Location matters for latency and regulation, but ownership, administration, encryption keys, access policies, support systems, and legal obligations matter too. The US CLOUD Act can require qualifying American service providers to produce data they control, even when it is stored outside the United States, subject to legal process and potential challenges. That does not mean Washington can browse every European database whenever it feels curious, and it does not erase European privacy law. It does mean that geography alone cannot settle the question of who may be legally compelled to hand over information.

American providers have responded with European data boundaries, sovereign-cloud offerings, local partnerships, and additional technical safeguards. Some of those protections are useful and should be judged on their actual design. But the phrase sovereign cloud can cover very different arrangements. Who operates the control plane? Who holds the keys? Who can change the software? Can the customer leave without rebuilding half its infrastructure? Europe also has real cloud companies, including OVHcloud, Scaleway, and IONOS, but competing with hyperscalers requires capital, global services, developer tools, reliability, and vast economies of scale. Ordering everyone to move tomorrow would be an expensive experiment in discovering how many European businesses rely on yesterday’s American APIs.

Europe Wants Its Own Starlink

The EU is developing IRIS², a secure satellite communications constellation intended to provide more resilient European connectivity. The public-private program carries an estimated overall cost of approximately €10.6 billion. On August 7, 2026, the European Commission and industrial partners confirmed an expanded design with 348 satellites: 330 in low Earth orbit and 18 in medium Earth orbit. First launches are targeted for 2029, with the earliest services planned after that. The primary purpose is secure communication for governments, defense, security, and emergency services, with commercial applications also envisaged. It is not simply Starlink with an EU emblem attached to the antenna.

The reason for building it is serious. A communications system that a foreign government or company can limit during a crisis is a potential national-security vulnerability. But a constellation requires far more than satellites: ground stations, launch services, terminals, network management, security, maintenance, manufacturing capacity, and enough usable bandwidth to justify its price. The revised satellite count is a design milestone, not proof of delivered capacity. A network with launches still years away cannot immediately replace one that is already operating and expanding.

Europe is not starting in orbit from zero. Eutelsat OneWeb operates roughly 600 low-Earth-orbit satellites, offering a real European-linked alternative for certain applications. Yet OneWeb and SpaceX’s Starlink/Starshield services are different systems, with different scales, equipment, coverage characteristics, and military integrations. In October 2026, restrictions affecting Ukraine’s use of the US-linked Starshield military service again highlighted the danger of critical dependence on a foreign-controlled system. The details of the restrictions and responsibility were still contested in reporting, but the practical lesson was hard to dispute: changing satellite providers during a war is not like changing broadband packages at home. IRIS² may eventually become a strategic asset. Right now, much of Europe’s answer remains a set of future launches and an extremely expensive waiting period.

The European AI Superpower, Powered by American Chips

On February 11, 2025, at the AI Action Summit in Paris, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen launched InvestAI, an effort intended to mobilize €200 billion in artificial-intelligence investment, including a proposed €20 billion fund for AI gigafactories. She spoke of making Europe an AI continent. There is nothing inherently wrong with such an ambition. The problem is treating planned investment as if it were the same thing as operational computing capacity, profitable businesses, or globally competitive products. A gigafactory is a remarkable word. It does not, by itself, train a single useful model.

Much of the hardware European AI projects depend on comes from companies such as NVIDIA and AMD, and their surrounding software ecosystems can create dependencies long after the servers are installed in Europe. Success also requires affordable electricity, data centers, engineers, capital, customers, reliable procurement, and room for businesses to scale. Europe has serious research talent and promising companies. What it lacks in several areas is not another aspiration but the combination of commercial speed and infrastructure necessary to compete. A data center in Sweden using American processors may improve European capacity. It does not make the processor supply chain European. I examined those contradictions in more detail in my article, Is Europe Becoming an AI Superpower? Ursula Says So!

The Chips Act: Twenty Percent on a Slide, Much Less in Reality

The European Chips Act entered into force in 2023 to strengthen Europe’s semiconductor industry and reduce supply vulnerabilities. It was linked to the ambition of reaching a 20% EU share of the global semiconductor market by value in 2030. Twenty percent is an excellent number for a strategy presentation. Unfortunately, chip factories are difficult to build, extraordinarily expensive to operate, and entirely indifferent to how confident the target looks in a Commission graphic.

On April 28, 2025, the European Court of Auditors warned that the EU was very unlikely to reach that objective. Its report cited a forecast of only 11.7% by 2030 and criticized weaknesses in planning, coordination, and the Commission’s ability to influence investments made by member states and private companies. Intel’s abandoned Magdeburg factory plans supplied a useful illustration. An industrial announcement can involve enormous proposed investment and public support while still producing exactly zero operating factories. The auditors did not say Europe should stop trying. They said the ambition and the mechanisms available to deliver it did not match.

Europe does have important semiconductor strengths. ASML, based in the Netherlands, supplies some of the world’s most advanced chipmaking equipment. European research centers and specialist manufacturers are essential to global supply chains. But designing chips, fabricating them, supplying manufacturing equipment, packaging them, and selling finished systems are separate capabilities. A machine built in the Netherlands may help produce chips in Taiwan for an American company whose products end up in a European AI installation. The whole arrangement can be economically beneficial and still leave Europe dependent. Global supply chains have no particular interest in political slogans about national purity.

European Batteries: Northvolt’s Expensive Reality Check

Europe’s ambition to build a competitive electric-vehicle battery industry was once closely associated with Sweden’s Northvolt. The company attracted investors, public support, prominent customers, and enthusiastic predictions about a European alternative to Asian battery manufacturers. Then came production problems, financing difficulties, restructuring, and bankruptcy in Sweden in March 2025. Industrial competence cannot be created by a compelling investor presentation. At some point, a factory must produce enough good batteries at a price customers can afford. Northvolt struggled with precisely that less photogenic part of the story.

The sequel was painfully appropriate. On February 27, 2026, American battery company Lyten completed its acquisition of major Northvolt assets in Sweden, including the Skellefteå manufacturing site and Northvolt Labs in Västerås. It announced plans to restart production and develop a broader industrial hub. The physical capacity, talented workers, and research facilities did not vanish, which is good news for Sweden. But a flagship European corporate-independence story wound up under American ownership. The factory survived. The ownership narrative needed rather more extensive repairs.

Even a successful European-owned battery factory would still require imported raw materials, refining capacity, specialist equipment, reliable customers, competitive electricity, and production expertise. Several parts of that chain remain concentrated outside Europe, particularly in China. Subsidies can help new industries get established, but they cannot guarantee manufacturing yields, fix every management failure, or persuade automakers to buy uneconomic cells indefinitely. Industrial independence is measured in repeatable output and sustainable economics, not in the number of oversized scissors assembled for a ribbon cutting.

From Schuman’s Peace Project to the Age of Permanent Strategy

It is worth remembering where European integration began, because the original ambition was far more important than finding an alternative to Microsoft Teams. On May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed pooling coal and steel production under a common authority, an idea developed with Jean Monnet, so that another war between France and Germany would become materially impossible. Six countries signed the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Over time, that cooperation grew into the institutions and single market of today’s European Union. Peace, shared prosperity, and practical cooperation were not trivial objectives. They helped transform a continent that had spent generations tearing itself apart.

Modern Europe has legitimate reasons to reduce technological vulnerabilities. The ICC sanctions show how US financial rules can reach people living in Europe. American-controlled cloud services can create operational and legal dependencies. A disruption in semiconductor supply could paralyze industry, while relying on one foreign satellite provider can become dangerous during a crisis. But none of that proves the EU must invent every application, manufacture every chip, or launch every satellite alone. Cooperation with the United States and trade with the rest of the world helped make Europe prosperous. Independence should mean having meaningful alternatives and the ability to say no, not pretending interdependence can be abolished.

That is why the successful examples matter. The French Gendarmerie did not become less dependent on Windows through a weekend declaration. It spent years developing skills and working solutions. Schleswig-Holstein publishes actual migration figures, costs, and remaining obstacles. European payment providers are connecting services people already use instead of demanding that everyone adopt a shiny but imaginary network. Those efforts deserve recognition precisely because they can be measured. If every project is mocked simply for being European, criticism becomes as lazy as the publicity it claims to oppose.

The recurring political ritual is the real problem: announce sovereignty, display a gigantic spending figure, promise a heroic deadline, and leave the dull details of compatibility, pricing, maintenance, governance, and adoption for somebody else to discover. A law can create incentives. A subsidy can finance equipment. A committee can coordinate decisions. None of them can force consumers to love a product, make an incompatible application work, or turn a delayed construction site into operational infrastructure. Europe does not suffer from a shortage of declarations. It suffers when declarations are mistaken for delivery.

Schuman’s generation wanted to make another European war materially impossible. Today’s politicians increasingly promise to make technological dependence disappear. The first goal reshaped the continent because cooperation was attached to institutions that actually worked. The second will require the same discipline: usable products, credible engineering, competitive prices, and the willingness to measure failures as openly as successes. Europe does not need another photograph of leaders standing in front of an enormous slogan. It needs the unglamorous result the slogan was supposed to describe.

For now, Europe has plenty of ambitious plans, impressive announcements, and promises of a technologically independent future. And promises create hope. Hope costs nothing.

Unfortunately, it doesn’t manufacture microchips, launch satellites, or develop competitive technology either. Until political ambitions turn into working solutions, European technological independence will remain another beautifully presented promise. And that sucks.

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